Sunday, February 26, 2017

Measurables of Starting NFL tight ends


After Rob Gronkowski's season ending injury in 2016, Martellus Bennett put up arguably the best season of his career with the Patriots. While this may just be the Tom Brady effect, the discerning fan begins to wonder if Bill Belichick doesn't have some crystal ball that predicts which NFL tight ends have the potential to be starters and which do not.

While we don't have a crystal ball, we do have a mountain of data at our disposal thanks to metrics guru Jim Cobern. With his collaboration, a list of 230 potential NFL tight ends was compiled using combine data and college production statistics from 1999 through 2011 and classified into long-term starters (64 or more games started) and non-starters (less than 64 games started). Sixty-four games seems a reasonable definition of a long-term starter as it corresponds to 4 uninjured seasons of starts.

Exploratory data analysed included the following factors:

-Year Drafted
-Height (feet)
-Weight (lbs)
-Arm length (inches)
-Hand size (inches)
-Reps of 225 lb bench press to failure
-Market Share of Yards in College*
-Strength of College Schedule*
-Player Age on Draft Day*
-Player Explosiveness Score*: formulated from vertical, broad jump and mass density
-Player Speed Score*: formulated from prospect's 40 yard dash
-Player Flexibility Score*: formulated from short shuttle, 3-Cone, and mass density
*normalized to all positional peers since 1998

And here is a quick summary of incomplete factors in these 230 observations:

Factor MissingMissing%
Hands 122 53.0%
Arms 119 51.7%
FLX 32 13.9%
Bench 28 12.2%
SOS 25 10.9%
EXP 16 7.0%
SPD 1 0.4%



Regrettably, the amount of missing data precludes meaningful inclusion of either arm or hand size in a multivariate analysis. Also, upon finding that Speed, Explosiveness and Flexibility scores were co-linear, the choice was made to use speed score exclusively due to it's 99.6% completeness. Furthermore, bench press was treated categorically as no bench press, 0-20 reps, 21 or more to allow for inclusion of the 28 cases of missing data for that factor of interest. Strength of Schedule, on the other hand, was found to statistically insignificant between starters and non-starters (p=0.365), so it was discarded as a potentially informative factor to increase the effective sample size (n=229).

The data was split into a training set (years 1999-2006) for model building and testing set (years 2007-2011) for validating this model.  Of the 144 prospects in the training set, twenty-three became eventual long term starters.  Forward and Backward selection models yielded the following concordant Maximum Likelihood estimates for the coefficients of the log linear odds of being a starter in the training set:

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter DF Estimate Standard
Error
Wald
Chi-Square
p-value
Intercept 1 -6.3632 1.1993 28.1529 < .0001
MSY 1 2.1063 1.0637 3.9213 0.048
Age 1 2.2931 1.0912 4.4156 0.036
SPD_Score 1 2.5358 1.1034 5.2816 0.022
benchtype 0 1 -0.2840 0.9623 0.0871 0.768
benchtype 2 1 1.1796 0.5967 3.9087 0.048

For any prospect, the implied log odds of this model can be converted to a probability of being a long-term starter. A receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis was employed to determine the optimal cut-point for this probability to balance the sensitivity (ruling in) and specificity (ruling out) of such a dichotomous rule.  It happened that using a cut-point of at least 15% correctly classified 72.2% of the sample as a potential starter or not.  The false positive rate of 66% of this rule left a bit to be desired, but the false negative rate of 5.5% implies we can be relatively certain when it classifies a player as a non-starter.

Be warned, this ROC curve analysis is really just a fancy type of data snooping: we visualize the balance of sensitivity and specificity, essentially looking every cut-point from 0% to 100% and look for the one that performs best!  So this method doesn't mean much unless the model has predictive power in an independent data set.  To this end, we used the same log-linear model above in the 2007-2011 data to estimate the probability of being a starter and applied this "rule of 15%":

Table of Starter by Predicted
Starter
(GS > 64)
Predicted ( >= 15%)
Yes No Total
Yes
11
1
12
No
26
47
63
Total
37
48
85

Computing the odds ratio associated with this contingency table suggest that a starter is 11.6 times more likely (95% CI 3.4-38.9) to belong to the list of individuals passing the rule of 15%. However, we'd be prudent to probe how much better our rule would do against a random guess in identifying starters and non-starters.

Starters = 29% (23/85)
True Positive = 30% (11/37)
False Positive = 70% (26/37)

So the rule of 15% improved the chances of finding starters by only 1% in the test set (29% to 30%), which is a little disappointing, but 30% really isn't far from the 33% true positive test rate that we observed in the training data.

Non-starters = 74% (63/85)
True Negative = 98% (47/48)
False Negative = 2% (1/48)

However, the rule of 15% improved our chance of ruling out non-starters by 24% (74% to 98%)! As it happened, Brandon Pettigrew was the only prospect that the model failed to identify as a eventual starter (goodbye to all the Oklahoma/Lions homers who are now dismissing the model entirely).  For the unbiased readers who press onward, here's a list of all the other player in the validation set, classified by their model selection and starter status.

True Positives (Passed rule of 15% with GS > 64 at end of 2016 season):
Year Name Bench MSY% Age% SPDScore% P(starter)
2007 Brent Celek 19 77.30% 79.79% 58.37% 0.19
2007 Zach Miller 16 76.77% 96.72% 31.75% 0.15
2007 Greg Olsen 23 72.97% 83.86% 95.44% 0.67
2008 Martellus Bennett* 18 90.42% 98.03% 80.42% 0.46
2010 Rob Gronkowksi 23 93.18% 99.08% 78.90% 0.74
2010 Ed Dickson 23 88.85% 65.62% 89.92% 0.62
2010 Jermaine Gresham* 20 78.87% 90.42% 87.83% 0.40
2010 Jimmy Graham 24 26.90% 24.67% 96.39% 0.17
2011 Charles Clay 18 89.90% 81.63% 71.29% 0.31
2011 Lance Kendricks 25 89.37% 46.59% 78.33% 0.44
2011 Kyle Rudolph 19 82.81% 96.19% 40.87% 0.20
*Projected 2017 Free Agent as of 2/27/2017

False Positives (Passed rule of 15%, but GS < 64 at end of the 2016 season):


Year Name Bench MSY% Age% SPDScore% P(starter)
2007 Scott Chandler 16 84.78% 92.13% 67.30% 0.32
2007 Ben Patrick 22 83.33% 67.85% 70.72% 0.48
2007 Clark Harris 21 83.07% 63.91% 54.56% 0.36
2008 Dustin Keller 26 81.63% 17.98% 93.92% 0.34
2008 Kellen Davis II* 22 77.56% 72.83% 91.83% 0.61
2008 Darrell Strong 17 68.90% 88.45% 80.04% 0.30
2008 Gary Barnage 22 63.91% 71.39% 73.57% 0.42
2009 Travis Beckum 28 96.06% 79.92% 79.28% 0.66
2009 Jared Cook* 23 80.31% 85.43% 94.30% 0.70
2009 Cameron Morrah 24 56.04% 83.99% 75.10% 0.46
2010 Aaron Hernadez 30 94.36% 99.74% 82.89% 0.77
2010 Dennis Pitta 27 87.80% 1.84% 62.93% 0.15
2010 Dorin Dickerson 24 78.22% 85.04% 96.58% 0.70
2010 Andrew Quarless 23 72.05% 95.67% 78.14% 0.62
2010 Anthony Miller 19 66.67% 78.61% 78.71% 0.24
2010 Dedrick Epps 19 50.52% 90.68% 60.08% 0.15
2010 Jeff Cumberland* 24 45.01% 56.43% 98.86% 0.39
2010 Michael Hoomanawanui 25 42.39% 91.47% 75.86% 0.43
2011 Rob Housler 22 87.93% 51.71% 97.53% 0.58
2011 D.J.Williams 20 85.70% 69.95% 91.63% 0.35
2011 Julius Thomas 16 79.27% 62.34% 75.48% 0.21
2011 Zach Pianalto 22 77.03% 88.85% 66.35% 0.54
2011 Virgil Green 23 68.64% 65.88% 95.25% 0.55
2011 Luke Stocker 27 55.51% 64.44% 83.46% 0.40
2011 David Ausberry 23 39.11% 17.59% 96.77% 0.18
2011 Jordan Cameron* 23 21.65% 66.14% 95.82% 0.31
*Projected 2017 Free Agent as of 2/27/2017

If Thomas, Cameron, Cook, and Barnage can stay healthy for another season or two, we'll likely add another 4 players to the true positives, bumping it to a more healthy 40.5% in the validation set.  To comment, it's notable the list includes 5 players that spent some time with the Patriots (Gronkowski, Hernandez, Hoomanawanui, Chandler, Bennett). It will be interesting to see if that list grows at all in the coming free-agency period, to confirm my suspicions that the Patriots are systematically better at selecting tight-ends than some other franchises.

True Negatives (Failed rule of 15% and GS < 64 at end of the 2016 season):
Year Name Bench MSY% Age% SPDScore% P(starter)
2007 Jonny Harline 15 81.89% 3.02% 31.18% 0.02
2007 Chad Upshaw 16 79.00% 61.29% 19.01% 0.06
2007 Martrez Milner 19 74.67% 66.27% 52.85% 0.13
2007 Joe Newton 20 70.47% 20.34% 18.44% 0.02
2007 Kevin Boss 19 65.88% 43.70% 37.26% 0.05
2007 Daniel Coats 34 63.25% 54.86% 26.43% 0.13
2007 Dante Rosario 20 56.69% 73.62% 46.39% 0.09
2007 Anthony Pudewell 15 41.34% 7.35% 2.85% 0.01
2007 Michael Allan 19 5.25% 15.88% 66.92% 0.01
2008 Evan Moore 16 82.55% 42.13% 21.67% 0.04
2008 Tom Santi 14 74.15% 75.72% 45.44% 0.13
2008 Jermichael Finley 20 71.92% 98.43% 23.57% 0.12
2008 John Carlson 20 67.98% 9.06% 21.29% 0.02
2008 Jacob Tamme 18 64.04% 51.57% 79.85% 0.14
2008 Derek Fine 24 61.42% 2.23% 44.68% 0.06
2008 Joey Haynos 17 58.79% 14.57% 20.72% 0.01
2008 Craig Stevens 27 33.20% 14.96% 93.73% 0.14
2008 Adam Bishop 21 28.74% 25.72% 4.75% 0.02
2008 Brad Cottam 24 17.19% 24.54% 90.87% 0.12
2008 Kolo Kapanui 23 5.38% 3.28% 15.21% 0.01
2009 James Casey . 90.16% 0.13% 60.27% 0.04
2009 Davon Drew 17 88.45% 25.59% 61.22% 0.09
2009 Bear Pascoe . 76.90% 49.74% 8.75% 0.02
2009 John Phillips . 74.80% 89.63% 40.68% 0.12
2009 Shawn Nelson 19 69.69% 18.77% 89.54% 0.10
2009 Kory Sperry 20 63.65% 7.74% 46.77% 0.03
2009 Cornelius Ingram 21 58.14% 10.10% 69.20% 0.12
2009 Jared Bronson . 50.26% 3.94% 76.43% 0.03
2009 Dan Gronkowski 26 43.83% 4.72% 45.06% 0.05
2009 Anthony Hill 21 36.61% 4.20% 50.38% 0.05
2009 Richard Quinn 24 19.55% 69.42% 48.29% 0.12
2010 Garrett Graham 20 81.76% 13.52% 62.55% 0.06
2010 Tony Moeaki 18 62.47% 60.24% 71.10% 0.13
2010 Colin Peek 19 48.29% 9.97% 14.45% 0.01
2010 Nate Byham . 46.72% 91.08% 31.37% 0.06
2010 Jim Dray 17 24.80% 42.39% 27.19% 0.02
2010 Mandel Dixon . 18.64% 20.21% 96.96% 0.03
2010 Fendi Onobun . 9.45% 23.62% 98.67% 0.03
2010 Brody Eldrige . 9.32% 53.81% 79.09% 0.04
2011 Lee Smith 25 75.85% 23.36% 24.33% 0.08
2011 Cameron Graham 18 75.46% 80.97% 4.37% 0.06
2011 Schuylar Oordt 18 73.49% 9.45% 89.35% 0.09
2011 Daniel Hardy 18 69.16% 15.49% 53.23% 0.04
2011 Allen Reisner 14 60.89% 71.65% 27.00% 0.06
2011 Weslye Saunders 19 50.13% 79.27% 68.44% 0.14
2011 Charlie Gantt 27 49.48% 35.43% 34.98% 0.08
2011 Larry Donnell . 35.56% 74.02% 34.60% 0.03

In summary, "all models are wrong, some models are useful", but it appears we've got a fairly useful model that can help separate the chaff from the wheat when it comes to singling out potential long terms starters.  NFL franchises, and fantasy football players, should be wary of acquiring prospects that fail our rule of 15%.